The Egyptian-Hittite Treaty. In regnal year 21 (c.1272 BCE), Ramesses II announced a treaty with Hattusili III. The two kings united in “peace and brotherhood, forever,” and agreed to a raft of provisions regarding their territories, vassals, rules-of-succession, and more.

As the first (surviving) treaty between the two Great Powers, the year 21 agreement is a landmark in the history of diplomacy. We explore the text and its impact…

Music: Luke Chaos.

Introduction

In February of 1272 BCE (approximately), Ramesses II was ensconced in his northern palace. The great residence, called Pi-Ramesses, was now more than twenty years old. Its halls echoed with the bustle of court life; and outside, the city resounded with the noise of construction. But amidst that clamour, so familiar to the residents, there came something new.

One day, a group of foreigners arrived at the palace gates. They were dressed in colourful robes down to their ankles; long black hair, and thick beards. Some of them wore helmets and carried shields, in a distinctive figure-eight style. They were Hittites, or men of the Hatti-Land. They came as an embassy.

The foreigners brought a special package to the pharaoh’s residence. Drawing it out of a box, they presented it Ramesses. The item was long-expected, and it did not disappoint. The Hittites brought a tablet, made of fine quality silver, inscribed with cuneiform writing.[1] It bore the fruits of a carefully cultivated agreement. On this Silver Tablet came a treaty. Ramesses II, King of Egypt, and Hattusili, King of Hatti, had made peace. The Egyptian-Hittite war was coming to an end.

In the 21^st year of his reign, the pharaoh Wasmuriya Satepnaria Riamessesa Maiamana (or Ramesses II) forged a treaty with Hatti. It was not the first such agreement, between the two empires, but it is the first to survive into the modern world. This Egyptian-Hittite Treaty is a landmark in the history of diplomacy. In fact, a large-scale replica of the treaty now hangs in the halls of the United Nations building in New York.[2] A symbol of the power, the value, of communication and cooperation.

The Egyptian-Hittite Treaty survives in two versions. One comes from Egypt, carved on the walls of Karnak Temple (in modern Luxor). The other is a set of clay from the ruins of Hattusa (the Hittite capital city). Today, they are in the Archaeological Museum in Istanbul and the Neues Museum in Berlin. The two versions are basically identical. They have minor differences in phrasing and style, that we’ll see as we go. But the fundamentals, the treaty terms, are consistent between versions. Which is great; when one text is damaged, scholars can use the other to fill in the gap; and they can look at those small differences to see how each culture approached and explained the agreements. In short, the Egyptian-Hittite Treaty is remarkably well preserved; to the great benefit of historians, and now to you.

I’ll tackle this document in two parts. First, the Treaty itself, what it actually says. In part 2, we’ll dive deeper into the context and the impact; and we’ll finish with a question offered up by ancient records… did Ramesses and Hattusili meet, in person, following this agreement? The Year 21 Treaty is a fun chapter in Egyptian-Hittite relations. Let’s explore.

The Treaty Text

As we start, there are two key things to keep in mind. Firstly, the two versions of the text. At Karnak and Hattusa, we have the surviving copies of the Treaty. Notably, each one presents the text sent by the other ruler. So, at Karnak, we have the treaty record sent from Hattusili to Ramesses; and vice versa. The one at Karnak is in hieroglyphs (translated from the cuneiform); and Ramesses has embellished it with a prologue and some rhetorical aspects that we’ll come back to later. But just to set the scene, the two versions each come from the other kingdom. Which will explain some of the small differences in the texts.

Peace and Brotherhood

As you can imagine, the first agreement is the big one. A statement of peace and unity between Ramesses and Hattusili. Combining the Egyptian and Hittite versions, the agreement goes as follows:[3]

“The treaty which [the relevant king] made upon a silver tablet… commencing good peace and good brotherhood between them forever.

“Formerly… the god did not permit hostilities between [Egypt and Hatti], by treaty. But in the time of Muwattalli, Great King of Hatti… he fought against Ramesses, Great King of Egypt. But now, as from today, [the two kings] make a treaty to establish the relationship which [the gods] had made… to prevent hostility from ever arising between them again.”

“[The Kings] have established good brotherhood and good peace between us forever (or “to eternity,” r nHH), in order… to create good peace and good brotherhood in the relationship of Hatti and Egypt, forever.”

As an opening statement, the Treaty is loud and clear. Henceforth, Ramesses and Hattusili will become brothers; no more fighting; the gods desire peace.

The text references the conflict that had raged between Ramesses and Muwattalli (Hattusili’s brother and predecessor). Notably, the treaty presents this war as an aberration, a break in the peace that had existed formerly. This was partly religious or philosophical, couching the Treaty in terms of a “divinely mandated agreement.” It was also historical. There is evidence for an earlier treaty, between Egypt and Hatti, made several decades before. We’ll come back to that shortly.

So, agreement #1, peace and brotherhood. A fine statement. How to enforce it?

Territorial Integrity

The next section confirms the peace in more practical terms. The two Kings make solemn vows of territorial integrity. From Karnak, we have (quote):[4]

“The Great Chief of Hatti shall never trespass against the land of Egypt, to take anything away from it. Likewise… [the] Great Ruler of Egypt, shall never trespass against the land of Hatti, to take anything from it.”

Fairly straightforward. The Karnak version phrases it simply, as a promise. The Hattusa version is slightly different, because it adds a component of divine guarantee:

“(This is) the eternal regulation which the Sun-God and the Storm-God made for Egypt with Hatti; (it) intends peace and brotherhood, and to prevent hostilities between them… Egypt will be at peace and brotherhood with Hatti forever.”

Again, fairly straightforward. Peace and brotherhood, which the gods themselves guarantee.

Notably, this promise of territorial security is quite vague on which territories they mean. In a modern treaty, one might expect precise definitions of borders and vassal states, which were part of the respective empires. The treaty doesn’t do that. Maybe such details were agreed verbally rather than in writing; or maybe the respective territories were taken for granted.[5]

Everyone knew “this town and this land belongs to Egypt, that one to Hatti;” and there was no need to be too precise. But it is curious that, given they are promising to respect one another’s territories, they don’t specify which territories those were. Just a different mindset, generally.

Renewing Previous Treaties

Now, the Treaty does something that is extremely Hittite. It includes a short retrospective of previous agreements and relations. This appears in many Hittite treaty texts; a way of “setting the scene,” and preparing the terms. At Karnak, we get the following:

“As for the existing treaty, which had been here/current in the time of Suppiluliuma, the Great Ruler of Hatti; and likewise, the standing treaty which had existed in the time of Muwattalli, the Great Ruler of Hatti, my father [*note: it should read brother? Unless ‘father’ means ‘predecessor’], I hold firm to it. Behold, Ramesses… also holds firm to it, to the treaty/peace which he has made … with us beginning today. We both hold firm to it; we shall remain within this regular relationship.”[6]

Hattusili mentions earlier treaties, but his phrasing is terribly vague. Was the Hittite saying there was a treaty made by Suppiluliuma and a second treaty made by Muwattalli; or was he saying there was one treaty, made by Suppiluliuma, which remained in effect until the reign of Muwattalli?

This passage has caused great debate among specialists for both cultures.[7] Today, I’m following the Hittitologist Dietrich Surenhagen and the Egyptologist Peter Brand. These two scholars make strong arguments (based on context, grammar and syntax) that there was just one treaty. It had come about in the time of Suppiluliuma I, in the mid-1300s; and it lasted until the reign of Muwattalli II, at which point hostilities broke out once more.[8] Chronologically, that’s still frustrating, because Muwattalli’s reign overlaps with Ramesses II, his father, his grandfather, and Horemheb. So, even with that “one treaty” mode, we don’t know who broke the peace. But someone did, and the ensuing conflagration had burned hot… until now.

These three provisions – Peace and Brotherhood; Territorial Integrity; and Renewing Previous Treaties – set the scene and the tone. But the agreements were not solely devoted to peace. There were other concerns, that both Kings would address.

Mutual Defence

The next covenant was strategic. The two kings had made peace with each other, but what if their mutual territories were threatened by a third party? Well, the two brothers now agreed to a pact of mutual defence. The treaty says:

“If some enemy should come against the territories of [either King]… and he sends word to [the other], saying ‘Come with me as ally against the enemy!’ then [the ruler] will come forth and kill that enemy. But if the [ally] has no desire to go [in person] then he must send his troops and chariots, and they will kill the foe.”[9]

Hittite treaties often include such clauses. Muwattalli had probably invoked one from his vassals when he gathered his coalition to fight Ramesses at Kadesh. Now, Hattusili and Ramesses cast their brotherhood in bronze, so to speak. If they ever needed assistance against a foe, say the Kushites, Assyrians, or Babylonians… they would despatch infantry and charioteers in a mighty coalition. Would this clause ever actually be invoked? Only time would tell.

Solidarity Against Internal Treason

Beyond the mutual defence against external foes, the treaty also provides security against rebellion. It’s basically the same clause: if a vassal rebels (or ‘trespasses’) against either King, the other will come in person or despatch soldiers to assist.[10] In the big picture, this one kind of guarantees that earlier clause of “respect each other’s territory.” After all, two of Hatti’s vassals were Kadesh and Amurru, both of which had checkered histories of loyalty. Likewise, Ramesses II had recently dealt with (or claimed to deal with) rebellion in northern Canaan. So, technically, this clause guaranteed: even if those vassals were disloyal again, the two Great Kings would secure the other’s authority. There would be no more “back and forth” of the border lands.

Ensuring the Hittite Royal Succession

Now, we have a most important clause. At least for Hattusili. In the next passage, we find a guarantee of succession for Hattusili’s heirs. The treaty says:

“The son of Hattusili, King of Hatti, shall be made King… in place of Hattusili, after the many years of (his life). And if [someone] in Hatti commits an offense against (the heir), then Ramesses, Beloved of Amun, must send troops and chariots to take revenge on them…”[11]

This passage is quite noteworthy. Firstly, the phrasing varies slightly between the two versions. In the Hattusa version, it’s fairly straightforward. The King of Egypt promises to protect Hattusili’s heir against any uprising or usurpation. At Karnak, though, it’s a bit more elaborate. This version adds a note that, when Hattusili dies and his heir becomes the next King, then should (quote) “be silent with his mouth forever.”[12] In other words, the King of Egypt must guarantee the inheritance of Hattusili’s son; and he must certainly not object or intervene to disrupt that succession.

Historically, there is a very clear logic to this. You see, Hattusili was not (legally) the rightful King of Hatti. When his brother Muwattalli died, the throne had gone to Muwattalli’s son, a prince named Urhi-Teshub. As the uncle of this new ruler, Hattusili had served in the court for several years. Then, he had rebelled, overthrown Urhi-Teshub, and seized power. Now, just a few years after that, Hattusili’s rule was based more on strength rather than true ‘legitimacy.’[13] What’s more, that nephew Urhi-Teshub was still alive; he had fled Hatti, into lands unknown. We’ll come back to that another time. But to make a long story short, it’s easy to see why Hattusili included the “succession clause.” He wasn’t secure in power, just yet; and should he die unexpectedly, there was every chance Urhi-Teshub (or some other leader) might rise up and make a bid for power. If that happened, there was a strong chance the rebel might appeal to other Kings (like Ramesses) for support. So, this clause was guaranteeing the future of Hattusili’s line. Ramesses promised to support the King’s chosen heir; and he also promised not to promote any other. Two sides to the same concern, but they give us a glimpse of Hattusili’s anxiety. 

The other reason this clause is interesting is that it only applies to the Hittite succession. There is no guarantee for Hatti to intervene in Ramesses’ dynastic legacy. There are two reasons why that might be. Firstly, compared to Hattusili, Ramesses was far more secure in power. True, his family was new to the thrones of Egypt, and that influenced some of his domestic policies (more on that in future). But the King himself was well-established. His father had promoted him to power, visibly; and Ramesses was now two decades into his rule. What’s more, the future looked promising in terms of dynastic stability. Pharaoh’s family was growing rapidly; he had many sons, and the odds of another group challenging one of them was probably quite remote.

Finally, there may be a philosophical or religious reason why the “succession clause” only applies to Hatti. For the Egyptians, the succession wasn’t something to be negotiated.[14] The lineage of Ra established at the dawn of Creation, had been bequeathed to Shu, then Geb, then Usir, then Horus, and now incarnated in the person of the monarch. Domestically, there might be breaks in the family line; even civil wars at certain periods. But no foreigner should influence that succession. Certainly not a Hittite. Did anyone want a repeat of the “Daxamunzu” situation, the Affair of the Egyptian Queen seeking a Hittite prince? Probably not. From that perspective, it would actually be worse if the clause had been reciprocal. And at the end of the day, this promise cost Ramesses little and rather benefitted him domestically. Carved on the walls of temples, the King of Hatti publicly “admitted” that his Kingdom was fragile, requiring outside support. Ramesses, of course, required no such protections, and would not ask for them.

You have to wonder if, in subsequent generations, anyone wished he had.

Extradition of Fugitives

Moving on, we have one more major clause. It concerns fugitives.[15] The two Kings promised one another that, if anyone should flee their kingdom, and go to the other land, then that ruler would return said fugitive to their rightful master. The two versions are basically identical. They say:

“If a great man (or noble)… or a town of people belonging to the lands of (either ruler)… comes to the Land of the (the respective king), then he shall not receive them. He shall have them returned to… their master. Likewise, if a man who is unknown (like a ‘commoner’) flees from the Land (of either King)… they shall not be left in (that other land); they shall be seized and brought back…”

Again, this is a common clause in Hittite treaties generally. Presumably, it was fairly common for high-ranking courtiers (or ordinary folks) to abandon their existing position and flee to another land. This one might also cover vassal territories, who “belonged” to their overlord (so, doubling down on the earlier defence pacts).

Either way, as far as the Kings were concerned, such flight was a rebellion against their authority. So, to protect dignity and prestige (not to mention discouraging others), fugitives must be returned.

However, the Treaty also makes a curious stipulation. In the next section, both parties promise that – when recovering a fugitive – they will not exact punishment on the runaway or their family. The treaty says:

“If a man flees from the Land of Egypt (or Hatti) and comes to (the other)… the Great King… must seize them and return them to… his brother (the other ruler). But they shall not punish them for their offenses. Let not (the fugitive’s) house, wives, or children be destroyed; let him not be killed; let not his eyes, ears, mouth, or feet be harmed; let no crime be held against him…”

In previous chapters, we’ve seen how difficult life could be under the Egyptian Kings. At Amarna, for example, there is evidence of brutal punishments like impalement (Episode 129 “Hard-Knock Life). The Decree of Horemheb punished crimes with disfigurement, cutting of the nose, and exile to border fortresses (Episode 171). Here, we get a promise of clemency. Whether it was upheld, we can only guess. The treaty doesn’t make any allowance for enforcement. Presumably, it rested on each King’s honesty and their concern for reputation. Hopefully it held up.

Witnesses, Curses, Blessings

The treaty ends with a series of religious components. First, we hear about the gods and goddesses who acted as witnesses for the agreement. Unfortunately, the Egyptian gods are lost (the tablet in Hattusa, sent by Ramesses, breaks off just after the fugitives discussion). So, we must rely entirely on Karnak and other fragments. According to that record, the Hittite deities who witnessed this agreement were many. I won’t read them all, but a partial list included:

“…the thousand gods, male and female, belonging to the land of Hatti; together with the thousand gods, male and female, of the land of Egypt… The sun god, Lord of the Sky, of the town of Arinna… the Storm God of Hatti… the god of Zipalanda… Aleppo… the goddess of Nineveh… the gods (who are) lords-of-the-oath; the goddess, lady of the earth, who is lady-of-the-oath… the mountains and rivers of the Hatti-Land; the gods of Qizzuwatna. The god Amun, Pa-Ra (or just Ra), Sutech… the gods of the Sky, Earth, the Great Sea, the Winds, and Clouds.”[16]

Presumably, the last part (with the Egyptian gods) was added by Ramesses or his scribes. Or maybe the Hittites were courteous enough to include the foreign deities, either out of respect or at least to properly invoke their witness. Either way, the treaty is confirmed by divine oversight. The two parties are bound by brotherhood and supernatural force.

Doubling down on that, the Treaty now moves to a final section.[17] In which Blessings are promised to those who uphold the agreement; and curses for those who don’t. The clause is simple:

“whoever does not keep (these agreements), the thousand gods of Hatti and the thousand gods of Egypt will destroy his house, his land, and his servants… Whoever shall keep these terms… the thousand gods (of both lands) shall cause him to flourish and live, together with his household, his land, and his servants.”

Again, we see the core principle of the treaty. It is an agreement between individuals, not “governments” in the modern sense; and the promise (or threat) extends from the monarch himself to his entire household which (implicitly) means everyone in his land. So, as long as they upheld the agreement, each kingdom would flourish. If not, well…

The Silver Tablets

Thus reads the Treaty between Ramesses and Hattusili. We are most fortunate to have “both sides” of the agreement. Scholars can analyse and compare the texts, to find the (minor) differences in phrasing and language; and see how each kingdom immortalised this document.

The Treaty itself (and letters sent between the courts) describe the physical document. Supposedly, the Treaty was inscribed on tablets of silver. There was one in Egypt, and one in Hatti. Apparently, each King presented the tablets (and the agreements) before their gods. That may have meant a ritual of approval. It could also mean that the Silver Tablets were literally physically stored in temple complexes. Unfortunately, the tablets do not survive. At some point in the past thirty centuries, they were lost, probably melted down. Maybe, if we’re lucky, they’ll turn up in the ruins of a palace, some forgotten storeroom overlooked by history. I wouldn’t hold my breath on it, but you never know.

Ramesses immortalised the agreement in monumental scale. The version at Karank is the best preserved, but there are also fragments of a copy from the Ramesseum. It’s a fair bet that other temples had their own versions; Ramesses liked to copy+paste between his monuments. We don’t know if the Hittites ever carved the treaty on a temple wall. Presumably, they displayed it somewhere, as a matter of prestige and pageantry. But whether Hattusili went to the same monumental lengths as Ramesses is a matter of speculation for now.

Post-Treaty

That brings us to the end of the treaty proper. What happened next?

A couple of letters, sent by Ramesses, were uncovered in the ruins of Hattusa. They mention the King’s satisfaction with the treaty, and how he “ratified it” at home. In one message, the King reports:

“Behold, I have now heard all the words written upon [the Silver Tablet], and I have laid [it] down before the nobles and the commoners, and I have made known to the people of Egypt [Mi-is-ri-i] all the agreements written upon it; and I have laid down the Silver Tablet, that my brother made for me, before the Sun God of Iunu/Heliopolis [A-na?] [and I have laid down the silver tablet before the great gods of Egypt.]”

The Treaty, while formalised as an agreement between the Rulers, had its public pageantry, too. Apparently, the King “presented it” before his courtiers and his subjects, informing them of what had been agreed. Of course, he later immortalised the treaty on the walls of temples. And there was the divine presentation. The King specifically mentions Ra (or the Sun God of Iunu / Heliopolis) as the offering-place where he sought divine approval. Presumably, the god gave it; and the treaty was accepted.

Peace was achieved!

In the aftermath, Ramesses shows a diplomatic enthusiasm for his northern brother. In fact, at one point, he even suggested a meeting.

Outcomes

The treaty was done. Its agreements laid out in full, carved on tablets of silver; and the two kings formally acknowledged every provision. For the most part, it is a straightforward promise. No more fighting; cooperation against enemies, both external and internal; security of territory (and extradition of fugitives); guarantees for Hattusili’s heir; and a blessing (or curse) upon both houses, depending how they upheld or broke the provisions.

Fundamentally, the treaty reads like a “Gentleman’s Agreement.” As Peter Brand notes, it’s interesting what the clauses don’t mention.[21] The specific borders between the kingdoms (say, Kadesh, Amurru, and Upe) were not discussed. Presumably, there was a verbal understanding, hammered out by the diplomats and approved by the Kings. But such definitions did not make it into the treaty itself.

There is also no mention of wealth exchange or trade. Such things did change hands, as gifts, and we hear about them in the letters. But the Treaty did not feature any such clauses. In this case, we must remember, both Kings were anxious to appear as equals, “brothers,” with no hint of disparity between them. Had the treaty gone so far as to include gifts or wealth exchange, that could easily read as tribute, from a subordinate to a superior. So, better to leave that out; send gifts as a courtesy, in normal correspondence. But there would be no material exchange as part of this agreement.

So, apart from the peace aspect, what was everyone getting out of it?

For Hattusili, the benefits were twofold.[22] First, the King of Hatti gained legitimacy. He achieved recognition as a “Great King” (LUGAL.GAL) and he got it directly from the ruler of Egypt. Such recognition, at least internationally, established Hattusili as a legitimate ruler (rather than a usurper). We can only guess how far that extended domestically. But at the very least, this treaty boosted Hattusili’s diplomatic prestige.

The other side of that was the security for his heirs. As a usurper, the King of Hatti probably had many concerns about the future and stability of his kingdom. After all, Muwattalli had been a Great King; look what had happened to his house. The promise given, by Ramesses, to both acknowledge Hattusili’s heir and to not intervene in the succession… that may have been a great balm to Hittite concerns.

In short, Hattusili’s primary gain was prestige as a Great King and security for his family.

Secondly, the peace itself probably had some major benefits in the strategic sense. Especially in Syria. The mutual promises not to attack each other’s territory, and to reject any rebels or fugitives, meant that Hatti and Egypt no longer needed to guard their border zones quite so strongly. Hattusili, for instance, could worry less about Amurru, Kadesh, and whether the Egyptians might raid or encourage rebellions. Thus, he could perhaps move troops to other areas where security was lacking. This may have been quite beneficial, especially to the East.

Around the time that Hattusili overthrew his nephew; and while Ramesses was rampaging around the Syrian heartlands, another power was threatening Hittite territory. This was the kingdom of Ashur (or Assyria). An old land, east of the Tigris, which had seen better days in centuries past. Now, though, a new generation of rulers were expanding their power, and directly challenging Hatti in the floodplains of (what is now) northern Iraq. Recently, the Assyrians had even defeated the Hittites in battle (or at least, they’d claimed to); but that’s a story for another chapter.

In short, the Hittites were dealing with a difficult situation in Syria and Mesopotamia, especially on their eastern borders. An end to the conflict with Egypt may have been just what the Storm God ordered. Some breathing space, an opportunity to reallocate troops, and hopefully restore their flagging prestige.

To be clear, there is no mention of Ashur itself in the Treaty. Even with those “mutual defence” clauses, there is no suggestion that Hattusili wanted Ramesses to attack the Assyrians. Or that Ramesses would have any concern about the Assyrians attacking him. At best, it was more of a “background issue.” Something to worry about in the future, but not something addressed in the treaty itself.

So, Hattusili got legitimacy, for himself as a Great King, and for his family when he died. He also got security in Syria; and the prestige of calling Egypt’s pharaoh his “brother.” A reasonable deal all things considered.

What about Ramesses?

For the pharaoh, the Treaty’s impact is slightly more abstract. There was the immediate benefit of peace and quiet on the northern borders. However, Ramesses did have to give up his raids of Syria; and he could no longer (legitimately) press a claim on Amurru or Kadesh. It’s hard to tell just how vital those concerns were. For one thing, the Egyptian raids in Syria had started to slow down by Year 15 or so. By Year 21, Ramesses was in his early forties at least. He might carry on, leading one campaign after another. But the benefits of that were never guaranteed. Perhaps, in the end, the Egyptians decided to hold what they had rather than keep pushing north. Better to secure Canaan for good, than endlessly stretch into Syria. Perhaps. That’s speculative. Certainly, the end to the war (and the guarantees against rebellions or interference) would help secure the Canaanite territories.

At home, the peace treaty probably brought some prestige to Ramesses himself. For one thing, the King carefully “edited” these texts when he immortalised them on temple walls. At Karnak, for instance, the Treaty includes a prologue where Ramesses describes the Hittites coming to him to “request peace from the Person of (the pharaoh)…” So, Ramesses presented the text to his audience (human and divine) as an act of submission from the wretched enemy. Similarly, the Karnak version makes a subtle distinction between the status of Ramesses and Hattusili. Throughout that text, you’ll find the Egyptian King described as 1qA aA, “Great Ruler/Sovereign.” The Hittite, by contrast, is always called the wr aA, “Great Chief,” rather than King. So, at home in Egypt, the pharaoh downgraded his “brother” to a slightly lower status. He didn’t do that in the diplomatic correspondence; Ramesses (or his scribes) always gave Hattusili his proper titles. But in the monumental record, the one intended to last for eternity, the King of Egypt played to his audience and shaped his message accordingly. We can only assume Hattusili did something similar at home, but the Hittite copy of the Treaty (on clay tablets) is far more modest than Ramesses’ great temples. Until more excavation work uncovers their monuments and royal art, we can only speculate how far Hattusili followed this path.

Anyway… Ramesses got security in Canaan; prestige at home; and a general sense of being “superior” to his northern rival. A reasonable deal, all things considered.

The Egyptian-Hittite Treaty, formalised in Year 21, was bold in its proposals (brotherhood and unity); but surprisingly abstract on details (borderlines, territories…) Overall, the agreement is surprisingly personal, a “Gentleman’s Agreement” kind of thing.[23] A bond between the rulers, representing their lands, but not involving the peoples of each land generally. Less “Treaty of Versailles” and more the “Peace for our time” declaration. For Ramesses and Hattusili, it marked a major shift in their relationship. The two rivals were now rivals no longer. They were uniting as family. The Kings had become brothers. There would be no further conflict.

Would it hold?

Yes. I won’t drag that out. The Year 21 agreement did mark an end to warfare between the two empires.[24] As far as the surviving records go, the Egyptians no longer raided Syria; the Hittites no longer pressured Canaan. The borders (however defined) would hold for the rest of Hattusili’s reign, the rest of Ramesses’ long life, and beyond. Henceforth, the two monarchs (and their families) would correspond with one another directly. They would send gifts, discuss relationships, and (of course) squabble about petty grievances or disputes. They would also engage in what we might call “foreign aid.” When the Hittites suffered a drought and loss of harvest, Ramesses sent grain to them and helped ease the burden.[25] Finally, while Hattusili and Ramesses had become brothers in a political sense, they would soon make that literal. Just over a decade after the Treaty, Hattusili would send one of his daughters to Egypt, to marry Ramesses himself. The negotiations for that marriage were long, and frequently frustrating for both parties. But eventually they achieved it, and the princess came to the Nile Valley. She became a Queen and eventually produced children. Thus, the two houses of Ramesses and Hattusili became one, cementing the agreement they made in this Treaty.

It truly was peace for their time.

There was one clause that, arguably, might have been broken. It concerned the extradition of fugitives. Specifically, Hattusili was concerned with his nephew. The deposed king, Urhi-Teshub, had disappeared following his fall from power. Reportedly, he had made his way to Syria, to Amurru, and then to Egypt itself. Hattusili would demand the return, or extradition, of Urhi-Teshub. But Ramesses demurred. References to Urhi-Teshub, in the diplomatic letters, suggest that pharaoh had played host to the prince, at some point. But he once again had fled, departing Egypt to lands unknown. That, at least, was the story Ramesses told Hattusili, when the Hittite demanded his nephew back. Was it true? We have no idea. But as we’ll see in future chapters, that issue of Urhi-Teshub was persistent; and on at least one occasion, it almost trigged war. But that’s a story for another day.

That treaty would hold, for the rest of their lives; and as far as history record, there was no further conflict between these two empires. Hattusili and Ramesses had achieved a lasting peace. A mighty achievement, and a credit to them both.

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[1] Description from the Kadesh Treaty:

[2] United Nations. (1970, September 24). Turkey Gives Peace Treaty Replica to United Nations for Display at Headquarters | UN Photo. https://media.un.org/photo/en/asset/oun7/oun7609528

[3] KRITA, II, 80—81; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 91—92.

[4] KRITA, II, 81; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 92—93.

[5] Brand, Ultimate Pharaoh, 307.

[6] KRITA, II, 81; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 92—93.

[7] Summary in Brand, Ultimate Pharaoh, 313 nn. 51, 52, 53. For the “two treaties” camp, see Murnane, W. J. (1990). The Road to Kadesh: A Historical Interpretation of the Battle Reliefs of King Sety I at Karnak (2nd ed.) and Devecchi, E., & Miller, J. L. (2011). Hittite-Egyptian Synchronisms and their Consequences for Ancient Near Eastern Chronology. In J. Mynářová (Ed.), Egypt and the Near East – The Crossroads (p. 139—176).

[8] Sürenhagen, D. (2006). Forerunners of the Hattusili-Ramesses Treaty. British Museum Studies in Ancient Egypt and Sudan, 6, 59–67. https://britishmuseum.iro.bl.uk/concern/generic_works/df640471-59dc-446d-8c35-0ba6db52bf19; see also Edel, E. (1997). Der Vertrag zwischen Ramses II. von Ägypten und Ḫattušili III. von Ḫatti, 29. https://archive.org/details/edel_1997_vertrag_zwischen_ramses_ii_von_agypten_und_hattusili_iii_von_hatti

[9] KRITA, II, 82; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 93.

[10] KRITA, II, 82; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 93.

[11] KRITA, II, 82; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 93; Edel, Der Vertrag zwischen Ramses II. von Ä gypten und Ḫattušili III. von Ḫatti, 8 S.10.

[12] Spalinger, “Considerations on the Hittite Treaty,” 340—341.

[13] Bryce, Kingdom of the Hittites, 266, 268—273.

[14] Brand, Egypt’s Ultimate Pharaoh, 311.

[15] KRITA, II, 82—83, 85; Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, 93—95.

[16] KRITA, II, 83—84.

[17] KRITA, II, 84.

[18] Bryce, Letters of the Great Kings, 80—81.

[19] Bryce, Letters of the Great Kings, 81 n. 32; contra, see Brand, Ultimate Pharaoh, 340 n. 25.

[20] Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, 323—324.

[21] Brand, Ultimate Pharaoh, 307.

[22] Bryce, T. (2006). The ‘Eternal Treaty’ from the Hittite Perspective. British Museum Studies in Ancient Egypt and Sudan, 6, 1–11. https://britishmuseum.iro.bl.uk/concern/generic_works/df640471-59dc-446d-8c35-0ba6db52bf19

[23] Brand, Ultimate Pharaoh, 307—308.

[24] Following sections: Guo, “How Well Did the ‘Eternal Treaty’ Function?” 38—44.

[25] Edel, Die ägyptisch-hethitische Korrespondenz, 183, 185.